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I.  Introduction 
During the last few years there has been an increasing anti-globalization 
sentiment among politicians and the public at large in a number of countries.  Some 
authors have argued that globalization has gone too far and that the relaxation of barriers 
to international trade and capital movement has increased vulnerability and income 
inequality.  Stiglitz (2002), for instance, has argued that globalization policies and market 
oriented reforms have the potential of doing a lot of good, if undertaken properly.  
According to him, however, globalization has not been pushed carefully or fairly.  On the 
contrary, in his view, during the 1990s and early 2000s liberalization policies were 
implemented too fast, in the wrong order, and often using inadequate – or plainly wrong 
– economic analysis.   
Criticism of globalization has been particularly strong in Latin America, where in 
recent years a number of leaders from the left have been elected presidents. Hugo Chávez 
of Venezuela is the most outspoken of them, but he is not the only one.  Other that are (or 
have been) equally critical of globalization, market orientation and the “Washington 
Consensus” include Nestor Kirshner of Argentina, Evo Morales of Bolivia, Rafael Correa 
of Ecuador, and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua.  Many governments in Latin America have 
announced the nationalization of foreign investments, have imposed price controls, and 
have partially undone the opening of their economies by increasing import duties, export 
taxes and other forms of trade barriers. 
In this paper I analyze Latin America’s experience with economic reform during 
the last twenty years, and I ask why the pro-markets and globalization policies of the 
“Washington Consensus” have become increasingly unpopular in the region.  The main 
conclusions of this analysis are two:   
o  First, the successive currency crises that affected Latin America during the 
1990s and first half of the 2000s were extremely costly.  The best known 
of these are the Mexican crisis of 1994-95, the Brazilian crisis of 1999, the 
Argentine crisis of 2001-02 and the Uruguayan crisis of 2002.  Voters in 
most countries associated these episodes with market-reform and the 
opening up of their economies.  Understandably, this resulted in a   2
significant decline in the political support for so-called “neo-liberal” 
policies. 
o  Second, recent macroeconomics reforms – and, in particular, the reduction 
of fiscal and external deficits, and the adoption of flexible exchange rates 
– have greatly reduced the probability of major currency crises in the 
future.  This is good news.  This doesn’t necessarily mean, however, that 
in the years to come there will be an increase in the degree of support for 
globalization or market reforms in Latin America.  In fact, it is highly 
likely that Latin America will continue to lag other regions in terms of 
openness, strength of institutions, and competition policies. 
 
Long term growth has been disappointingly low in Latin America.  Between 1970 
and 2006 income per capita grew at an average of merely 1% per year.  Compare this to 
2.3% per capita growth in the advanced countries, 3% in Asia, and 3% in the Middle East 
and Northern Africa.
1  Only Sub-Saharan Africa, with a rate of economic expansion that 
averaged 0.9%, did worse than Latin America.  
Historically, social conditions have also been poor in Latin America.  For decades 
the number of people living below the poverty line has been very high and income 
distribution extremely unequal.  Indeed, some of the highest Gini coefficients ever 
recorded in the world correspond to Brazil and Panama.
2  Even Chile, Latin America’s 
most successful economy during the last 20 years, continues to have a very unequal 
distribution of income.  It is not an exaggeration to say that Latin America’s modern 
economic history has been one of modest growth, macroeconomic crises, inequality, and 
poverty.   
In 2004-2007, and partially as a result of higher commodity prices, Latin America 
experienced a growth revival -- real per capita GDP growth averaged an impressive 
3.15%.  This faster growth has been accompanied by lower external deficits, declining 
                                                 
1 These numbers for “Latin America” refer to Latin America proper and exclude the Caribbean countries. 
When these are included, however, the resulting rate of growth is somewhat higher, but the overall message 
does not change.  The Asian data refer to all of Asia.  If the analysis is restricted to the so-called “Asian 
Tigers”, the contrast with Latin America is even more marked.  
2 See, for example, the essays in Edwards (2007b), especially Prados de la Escosura (2007). See, also, 
World Bank (2003).   3
debts, and relatively low and stable inflation.  As a result of this, a number of questions 
regarding the region’s future have emerged: Will this acceleration of growth be 
sustained?  Will Latin America experience a social take-off, with significant reductions in 
poverty and inequality?  Will the Latin American countries avoid the type of 
macroeconomic crises that have frequently affected them in the past?  Or will this be 
another short term spur in growth that, at the end of the road, will not amount to a 
sustained improvement in economic conditions?  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  In Section II I analyze the most 
salient aspects of Latin America’s economic history during the 1940-1982 period.  The 
discussion deals with the Kennedy Administration’s Alliance for Progress, the debt crisis 
of the 1980s, and the “lost decade.”  In Section III I concentrate on the 1990s and the 
reforms of the so-called Washington Consensus.  In Section IV I focus on the succession 
of macroeconomic and external crises that affected a number of Latin American countries 
in between 1994-2002.  In Section V I deal with the cost of crises in greater detail, and I 
report results from the estimation of a number of variance component models that capture 
the effect of external shocks and disturbances on the dynamics of growth.  Finally, in 
Section VI I raise some questions regarding Latin America’s future and I provide some 
concluding remarks.   
Throughout the paper I point out those aspects of Latin America’s economic 
history that today are better understood thanks to Max Corden’s many contributions to 
economic analysis.  What is particularly interesting is that from early on Corden’s work, 
which was motivated by economic challenges faced by Australia, was highly relevant for 
understanding the travails of the Latin American nations.  I also show that much of the 
work undertaken by Corden in the 1980s and 1990s were – and, for that matter, continue 
to be -- extremely relevant for Latin America. 
 
II.  From Protectionism to the Debt Crisis of 1982: Fifty Years of Latin 
America’s Economic History   
In this Section I analyze 20 years of the region’s economic history, that go form 
the launching of the Alliance for Progress by the Kennedy Administration in 1961, to the   4
debt crisis of 1982.  This provides a historical background for discussing where is Latin 
America likely to go in the years to come.   
II.1  The Cuban Revolution and the Alliance for Progress 
Starting in the 1940s, most Latin American nations followed an economic strategy 
based on protectionism, government-led industrialization, and a broad involvement of the 
state in economic activities. For some time this government-led economic strategy 
seemed to work: growth picked up in many countries, and industrialization proceeded at a 
brisk pace.  During the 1950s many observers were optimistic and thought that economic 
development and prosperity were around the corner.  But underneath this veneer of 
success, deep inefficiencies and social tensions were simmering.  The newly developed 
industrial sector was highly inefficient, and in order to survive it required increasingly 
higher import barriers in the form of tariffs, licenses and quotas.  As a result of 
protectionism the region’s currencies became artificially strong, discouraging exports and 
hurting competitiveness in the agricultural sector.
3  As the 1950s unfolded, massive 
poverty persisted in most nations, and inequality – and, in particular, inequality between 
the rural and urban sectors – became more pronounced.   
In an increasing number of countries the population became frustrated by the lack 
of progress in social conditions, and by the brutality of authoritarian and dictatorial 
regimes.  The first signs that not everything was well south of the Rio Grande came in 
1952 when Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz – only the second person elected 
democratically in that Central American country -- implemented an agrarian reform 
aimed at redistributing land holdings.  His policies were resisted by landowners and large 
multinationals, and created a serious diplomatic rift with the United States.  In 1954 the 
Guatemalan military staged a coup that put an end to Guatemala’s incipient democracy 
and Arbenz’s socialist program. 
The triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 was a major wake-up call for the 
United States.  It quickly became clear that Fidel Castro was serious about creating a 
Socialist republic 90 miles from the coast of Florida, and that in order to do it he would 
                                                 
3 In his 1971 book (Chapter 5) Corden provides one of the most complete theoretical analyses on the 
connection between the structure of protection and the equilibrium real exchange rate.  His work on the 
subject was the bases for my own early analysis on Latin America.  Indeed my first publication, based on 
my undergraduate thesis, owes much to Corden’s work on the subject; see Edwards (1975).   5
rely on Soviet support.  But what was even more disturbing to Washington was that Fidel 
was extremely popular in the rest of Latin America. Guerilla movements tailored after 
Cuba’s 26
th of July Movement, quickly sprung in country after country.  By 1960, the 
Cold War had arrived in earnest in Latin America. 
The Kennedy Administration decided to tackle this threat through a two-prong 
strategy:  First, military assistance was provided to the region’s governments.  The aim 
was to professionalize local armed forces, allowing them to successfully engage Marxist 
insurgents that had taken to the mountains and jungles.  The second component of 
Kennedy’s plan was a vast economic assistance program for the region, named the 
Alliance for Progress.  This was formally launched in August 1961, at the Punta del Este 
(Uruguay) meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council.  Paradoxically, 
it was at this same meeting that Ernesto Che Guevara announced Cuba’s aggressive 
policy of nationalizing, without compensation, American investments in the Caribbean 
island.   
The Charter of Punta del Este called for ambitious goals for the Alliance for 
Progress, including:
4 (a) achieving a rate of growth of per capita income of at least 2.5% 
per annum; (b) a more equitable distribution of income; (c) the diversification of regional 
exports; (d) the implementation of “programs of comprehensive agrarian reforms”; (e) 
the elimination of adult illiteracy and the expansion of educational coverage; (f) the 
construction of massive social housing; (g) low inflation and price stability; and (h) 
putting in place the polices that would reduce the occurrence of major currency crises.  In 
order to achieve these goals the countries in the region were to develop consistent 
Economic Plans.  The charter also established that the United States, in turn, would 
provide substantial aid – 2 billion dollars per year --, for at least ten years.     
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, a decade after the launching of the Alliance, 
Latin America was a region of contrasts.  In some countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, 
growth had accelerated significantly, and averaged more than 6% per year; in others 
growth was modest at best (Argentina and Chile).  In some nations instability and high 
                                                 
4  The complete text of “The Charter of Punta del Este” may be found at: 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/interam/intam16.htm   6
inflation was the norm (Argentina), while in others inflation was very low, indeed lower 
than in the United States (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua).   
Most countries, however, shared two characteristics: (a) the degree of openness to 
international trade (both in goods and financial claims) was low.  Indeed, the protectionist 
policies that had first been implemented in the 1930s in an effort to encourage 
industrialization – the so called import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategies –, 
intensified during the 1960s and 1970s.  These policies helped create a highly inefficient 
domestic manufacturing sector, and resulted in an artificial strengthening of local 
currencies.  This, in turn, discouraged exports and reinforced the region’s economic 
quasi-isolation.
5  Effective rates of protection for manufacturing goods in Latin America 
were among the highest in the world.  At the same time effective protection in agriculture 
was negative in most of the region.
6  And (b), in most countries social conditions failed to 
improve significantly; poverty continued to be widespread, and income distribution 
remained extremely unequal.  Indeed, by the early 1970s many Latin American countries 
were among those with the most unequal income distribution in the world.
7  
II.2  Oil Shocks and Debt Crisis   
The oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979 shaped in a fundamental way the path 
followed by the Latin American countries during the last quarter of the 20th century.  Oil 
exporters – and, in particular Mexico and Venezuela – embarked on ambitious 
development plans aimed at rapid industrialization.  Most of this effort was led by the 
public sector, and consisted of implementing large and, as it turned out, inefficient 
investment projects.  As a way of leveraging the oil monies, governments in the oil 
exporting countries borrowed heavily from the rest of the world, and rapidly accumulated 
very large external debts. 
Oil importing countries tried to cushion the sudden worsening in their terms of 
trade – or prices of exports relative to imports -- by borrowing liberally from abroad.  As 
their oil-exporting neighbors, they accumulated foreign debt at a pace that turned out to 
be unsustainable.   
                                                 
5  See Diaz Alejandro (1981). 
6   Max Corden pioneered the use of the effective rate of protection (ERP) in analyses of the effects of 
commercial policy on output, welfare and the economic structure.  See, for example, Corden (1966a, 
1966b, and 1971).  On effective protection in Latin America, see Edwards (1993). 
7  See Edwards (1995).   7
In the aftermath of the first oil shock of 1973, many countries that for decades had 
maintained macroeconomic stability – mostly the countries of Central America – began 
to rely on monetary expansion to finance rapidly increasing government expenditures.  
As a result, inflation increased, exports loss competitiveness, and international reserves 
declined rapidly.
8  Most countries responded to this situation by implementing exchange 
and capital controls.  As macroeconomic disequilibria became more acute, a number of 
governments adopted multiple exchange rate regimes, where different transactions, 
including exports of different varieties of the same good, were subject to different 
exchange rates.  These systems were highly inefficient and encouraged corruption, and 
eventually forced many Latin American countries to devalue their currencies and 
abandon their decades-long fixed exchange rate regimes.  
In August of 1982 Mexico stunned the world when it announced that it was 
unable to meet a payment on its foreign debt.  As analysts would later find out, most of 
the oil money had been squander in highly inefficient investment projects, most of which 
were affected by graft and corruption.  The international financial community was 
shocked by the news, and rapidly began to retract from the region; country after country 
experienced what later became to be known as a “sudden stop” of capital inflows.
9  
Although no one knew it then, by the end of 1982 Latin America had entered one of the 
darkest periods in its history, the so-called “lost decade.”  During the next seven years 
income per capita in most Latin American countries barely grew, social conditions 
worsened quickly, and some countries suffered serious bouts of hyperinflation.  In 1989 
the rate of inflation in Argentina exceeded 3,000%; in Bolivia it was higher than 11,750% 
in 1985, and in Brazil it climbed to 3,000% in 1990.
10 
II.3  Heterodox Plans and Populism during the 1980s   
In the mid 1980s a number of plans were put in place in efforts to find a “silver 
bullet” that would expeditiously solve the debt crisis and return the region to growth, low 
inflation and stability.  Plans based on heterodox ideas, such as generalized price controls 
                                                 
8  The currencies of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua were for decades pegged to the U.S. 
dollar.  Costa Rica was an exception in Central America, and suffered from periodic currency crises.  
9 See, Calvo (2003) 
10 Max Corden contributed greatly to the analysis of this period of macroeconomic turmoil in Latin 
America.  See, Little, Cooper, Corden and Rajapatirana (1993).   8
and half-baked monetary reforms, were implemented in Argentina (Austral Plan) Brazil 
(Cruzado Plan), and in Peru (Plan Inti).   
Many countries resorted to pegging the value of the local currency to the U.S. 
dollar; it was though that by controlling the price of foreign exchange, import prices 
would stabilize and inflation would decline.  These policies appeared to work at first, but 
it soon became apparent that fixing the exchange rate at an artificial level was not 
sustainable; exports’ competitiveness declined, imports became very cheap, and large 
trade deficits developed.  In particular, pegging the exchange rate in the face of ongoing 
fiscal and monetary disequilibria proved to be a recipe for disaster.  As a result of these 
policies, scarce foreign currency reserves plummeted, furthering macroeconomic 
imbalances. 
Many of the heterodox programs of the 1980s were populist, in the sense that they 
used unsustainable macroeconomic policies to obtain short term benefits – including 
income distribution effects --, without regard for long term consequences.  This was 
particularly the case in Peru, where under the leadership of President Alan García the 
fiscal deficit ballooned, and money was printed at increasingly rapid rates by the Central 
Bank.  At the same time, and in an effort to quell inflation, prices were tightly controlled 
at artificial levels.  These populist policies ended up in failure: inflation skyrocketed, 
unemployment went through the roof, and growth was negative.  Worse yet, Peru spiraled 
into political chaos, with the Maoist Shining Path guerilla movement taking control of 
vast parts of the countryside.
11 
By the mid and late 1980s inflation was out of control in countries as diverse as 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay.  As it has always been the case, the poor 
were the ones that suffered the most.  They couldn’t protect themselves from the ravaging 
effects of continuously increasing prices, nor could they move their savings to Miami, 
Panama City or Zurich. 
 
III.  Market Reforms, Freer Trade and the “Washington Consensus” 
As the years passed, and the region sank further into economic dysfunction, it 
became increasingly apparent that a solution to the crisis would require coordinated 
                                                 
11 See, Dornbush and Edwards (1991) for a discussion of Peru’s experience under President Alan Garcia.   9
action by the Latin American governments, creditor governments, lenders, and the 
international multilateral institutions.  A breakthrough was achieved in 1989 when the 
“Brady Plan” was announced.  This initiative relied on voluntary debt reduction, and 
consisted on exchanging old non performing bank debt for new long-term bonds with a 
lower face value.  In order to be eligible to participate in the Brady debt exchanges the 
Latin American countries had to show a commitment to implement some economic 
reforms.  Mexico and Costa Rica were the first countries to take advantage of this plan in 
1989; Venezuela and Uruguay followed in 1990 and 1991, and Argentina and Brazil in 
1992.
12 
Agreeing on the details of the Brady Plan was not easy, and took repeated rounds 
of consultation and bargaining.  Negotiations with Mexico – one of the larger debtors – 
became particularly difficult during the first half of 1989.  Newly elected president Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari insisted in obtaining major debt reduction, as well as sizable fresh 
financial resources.  Discussions dragged for months and involved officials from the 
Federal Reserve Board, as well as from the G-7 governments.  In late July 1989, 
agreement was reached; Mexico received debt relief of approximately 55% of the face 
value of its debts.   
The implementation of the Brady Plan had two important consequences: First, 
countries that restructured their debts were able, once again, to access the international 
financial markets and borrow from abroad.  Second, a large secondary market for 
emerging markets’ debt was developed.  This market was highly liquid, and allowed all 
types of investors -- large and small, individual and institutional, long term and 
speculators -- from all over the world to invest in the developing nations.  The fact that 
this was bonded debt made a significant difference from the pre-1982 situation, when 
most lending to Latin America (and other emerging countries, for that matter) was in the 
form of syndicated bank loans. 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s an increasing number of Latin American 
countries embarked on market-oriented reforms.  These programs, which have received 
the name of the “Washington Consensus,” were based on efforts to reduce fiscal 
                                                 
12 Max Corden made important contributions to the analysis of alternative ways of dealing with the “debt-
overhang” situation created by the crisis.  See, for example, Corden (1989a, 1989b), and Corden and 
Dooley (1989).     10
imbalances and inflation, open the economy to international trade, deregulate investment 
and the business sector, develop domestic capital markets, and privatize public 
enterprises.  In addition, there was an effort to reallocate public expenditures towards the 
poorest segments of society.
13  These reforms rapidly bore fruit on the macroeconomic 
front.  Inflation declined and with that credit was once again available. In some countries 
– most notably in Argentina, Chile and Peru – GDP growth increased drastically, 
exceeding 6% per annum.
14   
In contrast with the Alliance for Progress, the Washington Consensus was not an 
officially sanctioned economic program.  It was rather a collection of loosely articulated 
ideas aimed at modernizing, deregulating and reforming the Latin American economies.  
There has been considerable controversy on whether the name Washington Consensus 
correctly reflects the origin of these ideas.  I have argued elsewhere that the Washington 
institutions – the U.S. Treasury, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – 
had little to do with the launching of these market oriented reforms.  Clearly, these 
reforms were not imposed or forced upon the Latin American governments.  They were 
largely home-grown, and were Latin America’s own response to more than a decade of 
crisis.  In fact, the Washington institutions were skeptical – and in some cases openly 
opposed – to some of the most daring reform proposals.  To be sure, as time passed, and 
more and more countries adopted these policies, Washington began to support the effort.  
At the end of the road, however, the question is not the genesis of the reform ideas, but 
why did so many counties – virtually all of the Latin American nations, with the 
exception of Cuba – embarked on this reform effort.
15 
Trade reform and freer trade were at the heart of the Washington Consensus 
reforms.  It was thought that once the Latin American economies got rid of decades-old 
protectionist practices, their inefficient local industries would be forced to compete 
internationally.  As a result of competition, productivity would increase, exports would 
expand, and faster growth would follow in short order.   
                                                 
13  See, Williamson (1990). 
14  See, Edwards (1995). 
15  See Edwards (1995) for a discussion.   11
In a highly influential article, Williamson (1990) summarized the main goals of 
the Washington Consensus as follows:
16 
•  Achieve fiscal balance, as a way of reducing inflationary pressures.  
•  Direct public expenditure priorities towards the poor; generalized 
subsidies, which benefit mostly the middle class, are to be avoided. 
•  Implement tax reforms that would reduce distortions, lower marginal 
taxes, and broaden the tax base.  Tax administration must improve in 
order to avoid tax evasion. 
•  Interest rates ought to be market determined.  They should help 
allocate scarce capital to the most productive uses; they must also be 
high enough as to discourage capital flight. 
•  Artificially strong currencies are to be avoided.  Exchange rate policies 
should not discouraged exports, as it had historically been the case in 
Latin America. 
•  Wide-ranging trade reforms aimed at integrating the Latin American 
countries to the global economy should be implemented.  Import 
tariffs and other forms of protectionism should be slashed.   
•  Foreign direct investment must be encouraged. 
•  Inefficient state owned enterprises are to be privatized.  
•  Deregulation ought to be implemented at every level.  Red tape should 
be cut, barriers to entry in key industries must be eliminated, and 
competition encouraged. 
•  Legal protection of property rights must be improved. 
 
During the first half of the 1990s country after country began to implement a 
variety of modernization reforms.  Different countries proceeded at different speeds, and 
emphasized different aspects of the reforms, but the vast majority made progress in four 
areas: fiscal deficits were reduced; tax reforms were implemented; import quotas were 
relaxed and import tariffs were lowered; and state owned companies were privatized.  In 
most countries short term results were impressive: inflation declined drastically and 
                                                 
16  See Williamson (1990).   12
growth increased significantly: while in 1989-90 average inflation was 890%, in 1993-94 
it was 124%, GDP growth per capita was 3.5% in 1993-94, and only -0.5% in 1989-90. 
It is not an exaggeration to say that by 1994 there was heightened hope regarding 
the Latin American nations.  All of the sudden it appeared as if, after decades of 
frustration, the Latin American economies were ready to take off.   
But behind these impressive early results hid important weaknesses: Many 
countries – including the three largest ones, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico – had adopted 
rigid exchange rate regimes, and had allowed their currencies to strengthen 
significantly.
17  This reduced exports’ competitiveness in the global market place, and 
encouraged speculation.
18  In most countries privatization of public utilities – including 
energy, water and sanitation, and telecommunications -- was implemented without 
putting in place proper regulation and competition policies.  As a result, state owned 
monopolies were replaced by privately-owned monopolies.  More seriously, perhaps, 
most reforming nations failed to – or were unwilling to -- move forward in the creation of 
strong and modern institutions that would encourage the rule of law, protect property 
rights and reduce the extent of corruption.  Although these three areas – competitive 
exchange rates, competition policies, and institutional reforms --, were part of the original 
Washington Consensus Decalogue, most countries in the region paid only lip service to 
them.  
  
IV.  Crises and of the Reaction Against the Washington Consensus in the 2000s   
During the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s hope was replaced by a chain 
of deep and traumatic crises.  In December 1994, and after a year of political upheaval 
that included the Chiapas uprising and the assassination of the ruling party’s presidential 
candidate, the Mexican Peso collapsed and was devalued by more than 65%. The 
Mexican crisis generated a wave of “contagion” through the region, testing the strength 
of the reformed economies.  Capital flows into Latin America declined, and the cost of 
borrowing internationally -- as measured by the spread paid by Latin American bonds 
                                                 
17 Max Corden’s Ohlin Lectures dealt with the choice of the exchange rate regime.  See Corden (2002).   
18 The strengthening of regional currencies was to a large extent the result of very large capital inflows into 
the Latin American countries.  The effects of these inflows on real exchange rates and resource allocation 
were similar to those generated in Dutch-Disease cases.  See Corden and Neary (1982).     13
over and above the yield on U.S. Treasuries --, increased significantly.  Argentina, a 
country that had chosen a fixed exchange rate regime and a currency board, was 
particularly affected by what came to be known as the “tequila effect.”  
In mid 1997, when the region was beginning to recover from the Mexican 
currency collapse of 1994, the world was shocked by the eruption of severe crises 
throughout South East Asia.  Thailand was the first to go, followed by Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, and South Korea.  Although Latin America had limited trade and 
financial exposure to South East Asia, it was still subject to contagion.  In mid 1998 the 
global financial system was affected by two new crises and new bouts of contagion.  In 
August the Russian ruble was devalued, and in September the failure of the investment 
firm Long Term Capital Management, exposed the fragilities of a system, where it was 
possible, through the use of derivatives, to take huge open positions in international 
financial markets.  Following these crises, capital flows to the emerging countries 
declined significantly, forcing many Latin American nations to implement severe current 
account adjustments. 
During the next few years a succession of severe balance of payment crises that 
resulted in the collapse of currency values and large increases in unemployment erupted 
in a number of Latin American countries: Brazil in 1999, Argentina in 2001, Uruguay in 
2002, and the Dominican Republic in 2003.  Growth declined throughout the region, 
unemployment increased rapidly, and social conditions deteriorated.  Between 1998 and 
2004 the average rate of per capita growth in Latin America was a disappointing 0.75%   
The Argentine devaluation crisis of 2001 was particularly painful.  In December 
of that year, and after a week of riots and political unrest, Fernando de la Rua, 
Argentina’s constitutionally elected President, resigned.  A few weeks later Argentina 
defaulted on its foreign currency debt, and went through one of the most traumatic 
devaluation crises in modern history.  In little over two months the peso, which for more 
than a decade had been pegged to the U.S. dollar at a one-to-one rate, lost two thirds of 
its value.  The depth of the crisis was such that in a period of a few weeks the country 
went through 5 presidents.  In many ways, Argentina epitomizes Latin America’s   14
historical proclivity towards macroeconomic instability, trade imbalances and runaway 
inflation.
19   
An increasing number of analysts began to criticize the Washington Consensus 
and the market oriented reforms during the first half of the 2000s.  Three interrelated 
policy issues were at the center of these criticisms:  (1) in designing reform packages 
during the 1990s, crucial aspects of the sequencing and pace of reform were ignored.  As 
a result, it was argued, in many countries reforms were implemented too fast and in the 
wrong order.  (2) Advocating (and imposing) capital account liberalization was a serious 
mistake; it encouraged short term capital flows, fueled speculation, and increased the 
countries vulnerability to crises.  And (3), the IMF involvement in the Argentinean saga, 
and eventual crisis, was a disaster that made things worse rather than better.
20   
Critics of the Consensus also argued that the initial reform blueprint ignored the 
need to reform institutions.  This, however, was largely an unfounded criticism.  Indeed, 
the Washington Consensus Decalogue presented above makes clear that there was a need 
to improve institutions – including institutions that protect property rights and 
competition.  At the design level, however, most countries decided to proceed following a 
specific sequence: the initial steps would reform the economy’s structure and incentives; 
only when these reforms were consolidated would institutions be strengthened and new 
institutions created.  Of course, by choosing this specific sequencing, policy makers and 
their advisors were implicitly saying that institutions were not as important as economic 
policies or, at least, that they were not as important during the transition period.   
As a result of the macroeconomic crises and economic setbacks of the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, frustration erupted across most of Latin America, and the public grew 
increasingly skeptical about the merits of globalization and market orientation.  In 
election after election voters turned to the left, and elected Presidents that were clearly 
critical of the Washington Consensus.  Some of these new leaders – Hugo Chávez of 
Venezuela and Evo Morales of Bolivia – have been very vocal in their criticisms; others, 
have been more subdued.  Most of them, however, have argued that the region needs to 
increase spending in social programs as a way of reducing inequality.  In some countries -
                                                 
19  For a narrative of the Argentine crisis see Blustein (2005). 
20 See Stiglitz (2002) and Rodrik (2003).    15
- Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela – the new political leaders have announced policies 
that would undo some of the reforms of the 1990s.
21  These policies included the 
nationalization of industries, increased government controls, and higher import tariffs.   
In 2003-2007, and largely as a result of improving commodity prices and 
favorable global financial conditions, the Latin American countries experienced a surge 
in growth -- real per capita GDP growth averaged 3.2%.  The recovery was particularly 
pronounced in countries recovering from deep crises, such as Argentina and Venezuela. 
In addition to the pickup in growth, other macroeconomic indicators also improved 
during this period:  in most countries external debt has declined and inflation has stayed 
in check.  The combination of economic recovery and political movement to the left has 
raised questions about the economic future of Latin America.  In particular, will higher 
growth be sustained?  Will social conditions improve?  Will the region be able to avoid 
crises and currency collapses?  In short, and using a term coined by Albert Hirschman 
four decades ago, Is there a bias for hope?
22  Or will the region, once again, adopt 
populist policies that emphasize short term gains at the cost of longer term sustainability?   
 
V.  The Cost of External Crises in Latin America:  An Empirical Analysis 
An important question, within the context of Latin America’s economic history, is 
How costly have external crises been?  In this Section I address this issue by estimating a 
number of variance component models of the dynamics of growth. More specifically I 
estimate by how much growth (and the level of real GDP) have been reduced, on 
average, as a consequence of two type of external crisis: sudden stops of capital inflows, 
and current account reversals.
23  The analysis presented in this Section expands previous 
work on the subject in two important respects:  First, I explore several equation 
specifications that allow for very flexible dynamic responses of both growth and real 
GDP to external disturbances.  Second, I use a set of new instruments to deal with 
                                                 
21 Of course, not all elected leaders in the mid 2000s were globalization critics; Felipe Calderón of Mexico 
and Alvaro Uribe of Colombia are examples of presidents that support market orientation.  
22 See, Hirschman (1968).  In a recent book Santiso (2006) also asks Hirschman’s “hope” question. 
23  Max Corden addressed the costs of crises in his 1993 book – coauthored with Ian M.D. Little, Richard 
N. Cooper and Sarath Rajapatirana --   on crisis and adjustment in developing nations.  He also dealt with 
this question in Chapter 8 on contractionary devaluations in his Ohlin Lecture volume (Corden, 2002).     16
possible endogeneity issues arising in the estimation of the growth dynamic equations. 
The data set covers the years 1970-2004. 
V.1  The Model 
The analysis is based on a two-equation representation of the dynamics of real 
GDP per capita growth of country j in period t.  Equation (1) captures long run GDP 
growth in a way consistent with the “new growth” empirical literature; equation (2) 
captures the growth dynamics process.
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(1)   j j j j j s z x g ε γ θ α + + + =
*  
 
(2)   jt jt jt jt jt j jt u v g g g g ξ γ ϕ β λ + + + Δ + − = Δ − − 1 1
* ) ( . 
 
In equation (1) long term per capita GDP growth in country j  ) (
*
j g is related to 
structural variables ( j x ), policy variables ( j z ), and institutional variables ( j s ).  The error 
term ( j ε ) is assumed to be heteroskedastic.  In equation (2),  jt g is the rate of growth of 
per capita GDP in country j in period t.  The terms  jt v  and  jt u are shocks, assumed to be 
zero mean, finite variance and to be uncorrelated among them.  More specifically,  jt v  is 
assumed to be an external terms of trade shock, while  jt u captures other shocks, including 
sudden stops and current account reversals.  ξ t j is an error term, which is also assumed 
to be heteroskedastic.  λ , β , ϕ ,  andγ are parameters that determine the particular 
characteristics of the growth process.  Equation (2) -- which has the form of an 
equilibrium correction model --, states that the actual rate of growth in period t will 
deviate from the long run rate of growth due to the existence of four types of shocks, 
including deviations of (the lagged value of) actual growth and trend 
growth ) ( 1
*
− − jt j g g λ , and a lagged growth acceleration term  1 − Δ jt g β .  In this formulation 
it is expected that 1 0 < < λ , and 0 ≤ β . 
                                                 
24  This formulation is an extension of that of Edwards and Levy Yeyati (2005) and Edwards (2007a).   17
According to equation (2), over time the actual rate of growth will tend to 
converge towards it long run value.  The specific way in which convergence will take 
place is an empirical issue, and depends on the estimated values of parameters λ  andβ .   
For instance, if  0 = β , and  1 0 < < λ , equation (2) will be a simple partial adjustment 
model, where after a shock the actual rate of growth of will return to its long trend value 
slowly, without ever crossing that long term growth value.  If, however,  0 < β , it is 
possible for the actual rate of growth to overshoot/undershoot its long term value 
*
j g .  
For this to be the case it is required that β λ < .  As pointed out above, whether this will 
be the case is an empirical issue. 
Perhaps the simplest way of empirically addressing this model is by estimating a 
simple panel regression of per capita growth with country specific dummies for the 
intercept.  In this case the regressors would be once and twice lagged growth, as well as 
the different shocks.  Each country specific dummy is an estimate of
*
j g λ  for that 
particular country.  From the coefficients of  1 − t g and  2 − t g it is possible to find the 
estimated value ofλ , and from the country specific intercepts the estimated long term 
trend rate of growth for each country.  An alternative strategy, and the one followed in 
this paper, is to use a two stages procedure.  In the first stage long term cross country 
averages are used to estimate the long term growth equation (1). The first stage results are 
then used to generate long-run predicted growth rates for each country; these are used in 
the estimation of the growth dynamic equation (2) in the second stage.  The main 
advantage of this approach is that long term growth is, in fact, related to those variables – 
policy, structural, and institutional -- that according to modern economic analysis affect 
economic performance in the long run. 
The main interest from the perspective of the discussion in this paper is the effect 
of sudden stops and current account reversals on growth; that is, whether coefficient γ is 
significantly negative.  A sudden stop is defined as a reduction in net capital inflows of at 
least 5% of GDP in one year.
25  A current account reversal, on the other hand, is defined 
                                                 
25 To qualify as a sudden stop episode, the country in question must have been a net importer of capital in 
the previous year.  In order to check for the robustness of the results, I also used two alternative definitions 
of sudden stops, which considered a reduction in inflows of 3 and 7% of GDP in one year.     18
as a reduction in the current account deficit of at least 4% of GDP in one year.
26  In the 
estimation of equation (2), I used dummy variables for sudden stops and reversals.  See 
the Data Appendix for details.  The results obtained in the first stage on long term growth 
are not reported due to space considerations
27.  It should be noted, however, that they 
generally support the notion that long term economic performance depends on structural 
variables, policy variables – in particular, policies that encourage competition --, and 
variables that measure the strength of economic, judicial, and political institutions. 
V.2  Basic Results 
  In this Subsection I present the results obtained from the estimation of the growth 
dynamic equation (2).  One of the difficulties in this analysis is the potential endogeneity 
of the current account reversal and sudden stop variables.  In order to deal with this issue 
I also present the results from instrumental variables estimation of equation (2) using the 
procedure suggested by Maddala (1983) and Keshk (2003) for systems where one of the 
endogenous variables is dichotomous. 
28      
In Table 1 I present the results from the estimation of the growth dynamics 
equation (2) using a variance component random effects GLS procedure; robust standard 
errors are reported.  Table 2, on the other hand, contains the estimates obtained using 
Maddala’s (1983) instrumental variables approach; again, robust standard errors are 
provided.   The following instruments were used:  change in the international terms of 
trade (current and lagged one period); the proportion of countries in each region 
(excluding the country in question) subject to a sudden and large decline of net capital 
inflows, lagged one period; world real interest rates lagged one and two periods; a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the country in question has suffered a major 
storm (tornado, hurricane and others); and a two-period lagged dummy that takes the 
value of one if there was a war in the country’s territory, the proportion of countries in 
each region (excluding the country in question) subject to a war in that period.   In each 
table the first two columns refer to the complete sample, while the second two are for the 
Latin American countries only.  
                                                 
26 I also used an alternative definition.  The qualitative nature of the results discussed below, were not 
affected by the precise definition of reversals or sudden stops.  See Edwards (2007a). 
27 See Edwards (2007a) for a detailed analysis of the long run growth in Latin America. 
28 See also Heckman (1978) and Amemiya (1978).   19
These results show that external crises have been very costly for Latin America.  
In all regressions the crises coefficients are significantly negative.  Moreover, these 
regressions suggest that crises have been significantly more costly in Latin America than 
in the rest of the world.  The estimated coefficients of the current account reversal 
variable ranges from -3.6 to -3.7 for Latin America; for the complete sample it goes from 
-1.3 to -2.1.  The estimated coefficients for the sudden stop variable ranges from -2.6 to   
-2.8; it ranges from -0.9 to -2.0 for the complete sample.  Not surprisingly, this suggests 
that current account reversals imply a greater cost – in terms of lower growth – than 
sudden stops.  Indeed, when both variables are included in the same regression the 
coefficient of sudden stops becomes insignificant.  
These results also show that terms of trade shocks have had significant effects on 
growth.  Improvements in terms of trade accelerate growth, while lower terms of trade 
result in growth slowdowns.  The terms of trade coefficients range from 0.80 and 0.11, 
and through some light on the question of the future of Latin America.  They indicate that 
a decline of the region’s terms of trade towards “normal” long term levels is likely to 
have a significant effect on growth; at the same time, these estimates suggest that the 
acceleration in the rate of growth in Latin America after 2002 is largely the result of 
improved international terms of trade.  I return to these issues in the concluding Section 
of the paper.      
The estimates of coefficients λ and β reported in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that the 
dynamics of growth is different in Latin America that in the rest of the world; for both 
samples, however, it is rather simple, as there is no evidence of overshooting.  In Table 1 
on GLS estimates the coefficients of β are significantly positive for the Latin American 
regressions; for the complete sample, it is insignificant in column 1, and marginally 
negative in column 2.   The results in Table 2 on λ and β are somewhat different, but it is 
still the case that β λ > ; this means that once affected by a shock the rate of growth will 
converge smoothly to its long run value.     
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V.3  The Role of Openness 
  As pointed out in Section IV, one of the key criticisms of the Washington 
Consensus is that the emerging countries opened up excessively to the rest of the world.  
A problem with this line of argument, however, is that there is ample empirical evidence 
that supports the view that countries that are more open to international trade do better in 
terms of long term growth, on average, that those with a close economy; the evidence on 
the effects of financial openness on growth is, on the other hand, inconclusive.
29   
This evidence, however, deals with long term growth and doesn’t say anything 
regarding the dynamics of growth.  It is perfectly possible, for example, that openness – 
both trade and financial – affects the way in which external crisis affect short term 
growth.  I investigated this issue by estimating an expanded version of equation (2), 
where in addition to the original regressors I included terms that interact the crisis 
variables and two measures of openness: trade openness, defined as the ratio of imports 
plus exports over GDP, and financial openness, defined as a 1 to 100 index, with higher 
values meaning a higher degree of openness (see Data Appendix for details).    
The results obtained when the random effects variance component GLS procedure 
was used are reported in Table 3 (robust standard error in parentheses).  As may be seen, 
the crises variables continue to be significantly negative; the coefficients of the variables 
that interact trade openness and crisis are, in all regressions, significantly positive; the 
variables that interact crisis and financial openness are not significantly different from 
zero.  These results indicate that countries that are more open to international trade are 
less affected by external crises than countries that are more closed to trade.  Consider the 
results in column 1 in Table 3: the impact effect of a current account reversal on per 
capita growth is: 
 
    Impact effect = -5.99 + 0.031 Trade Openness. 
 
That is, if country’s degree of trade openness is 20% of GDP, the growth effect of a 
reversal is -5.37%; in contrast, in a very open country with a trade to GDP ratio of 80% 
the estimated point effect of a current account reversal on growth is only -3.51%.  These 
                                                 
29 See, for example, Frankel and Roemer (1999), and Eichengreen (2001).   21
findings suggest, then, that contrary to the recent criticism on globalization and market-
oriented reforms, a greater degree of openness reduces the impact of crises on growth.  
Also, these regressions indicate that financial openness has played no role in determining 
the effects of crises on performance.  A related question, and one that is beyond the scope 
of this paper, is whether a higher degree of openness affects the probability of suffering a 
crises.  Recent results reported in Edwards (2007a) indicate that a greater degree of 
financial openness has a significantly positive, but quantitatively very small effect on the 
probability on experiencing a sudden stop. 
 
VI.  Concluding Remarks on Globalization and the Future of Latin America          
In the first four Sections of this paper I discussed the economic history of Latin 
America, and I analyzed the region’s evolution from protectionism and import 
substitution industrialization in the 1940s, to the market oriented reforms of the 1990s 
and early 2000s.  I pointed out that in the last few years there has been a growing anti-
globalization and anti market-oriented reforms in the region.  This has been reflected in 
the election, in country after country, of Presidents that have criticized, to different 
degrees, the Washington Consensus.  This growing skepticism on the merits of market 
orientation has been translated into different policies in different countries: in some – 
Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua – it has resulted in the backtracking of the 
reforms, the imposition of controls, the hiking of import tariffs and the nationalization of 
some industries.  In other – in fact, in the vast majority of countries in the region – this 
skepticism has resulted in the stalling of the reform effort.  Indeed, in most Latin 
American countries there has been very little progress in the reform front in the last 5 to 7 
years.  This is true with regard to both competition policies and institutional 
strengthening and reforms.  
In Section IV I argued that the anti reform sentiment was mostly the result of the 
public’s disappointment with the reforms.  This disappointment, in turn, was largely the 
consequence of the deep and very costly macroeconomic and currency crises that affected 
a large number of countries in the 1990s and 2000s.  These crises – Mexico in 1994-95, 
Brazil in 1999, Ecuador in 1999, Argentina in 2001, Uruguay in 2002, Brazil (again) in 
2002, and the Dominican Republic in 2002, to mention only the better known ones –   22
resulted in large increases in unemployment, reduced incomes, negative growth, and, in 
many countries, in an increase in poverty and inequality.  What made things worse was 
that the supporters of the reforms had oversold them, and had implied that the adoption of 
market orientation and the opening up of the Latin American economies would result in 
the end of the region’s legendary macroeconomic instability. Contagion stemming from 
crises in other parts of the world – East Asia in 1997-98 and Russia in 1998 – also 
contributed to the sense of disappointment with globalization.  From a political economy 
perspective, these macroeconomic crises also gave an opportunity to those groups 
negatively affected by the reforms – including domestic producers threatened by the 
opening of trade -- to regroup, and mount a more organized opposition to modernization. 
In Section V I tackled the question of the costs of crises in a formal way, and I 
report new results from the estimation of a number of panel regressions on the dynamic 
of growth, using both random effects GLS and instrumental variables techniques.  The 
analysis focused on two definitions of crises:  abrupt and large current account reversals, 
and large and sudden declines in (net) capital inflows.  The most important conclusions 
of this analysis may be summarized as follows: (1) external crises have been very costly 
in Latin America; indeed, more costly than in other regions; (2) Current account reversals 
have been significantly more costly than sudden stops; (3) Improvements (deterioration) 
in the international terms of trade have a significant effect on short term growth; a 10% 
change in the terms of trade results in almost a 1 percentage point change in per capita 
growth; (4) Latin America has exhibited a simple dynamics of growth during the last few 
years; that is, the functional form for the dynamics of growth implies smooth 
adjustments, and rules out overshooting in the short run; (5) countries more open to 
international trade have suffered a smaller effect of external crises than countries which 
are relatively closed to international trade. And (6) the degree of financial openness does 
not appear to affect the intensity with which crises affect growth.   
An important question is what to expect of Latin America and its relationship 
with globalization in the future.  Given the region’s history, it is unlikely that in the next 
few years –5 to 10 years, say – there will be a new pro-globalization and pro-reform   23
movement.
30  In that sense, it is important to realize that, as was documented in Section 
III of this paper, the massive and generalized move towards reforms of the 1990s was 
largely the result of the deep crisis of the 1980s, and of the dark mood that took over the 
public in most countries during the years of the so-called “lost decade.”   The most likely 
scenario is that in most Latin American countries the public will continue to regard 
market orientation with great suspicion.  As a consequence, the region will be one of 
incomplete or fractured reforms.  And without moving forward in the key areas of 
competition policies and institutional reforms it is highly unlikely that the region’s 
countries will experience an increase in their long term rate of growth.  In that regard, it 
is likely that, once the terms of trade return to their more normal level, growth will revert 
to its mediocre long term historical average of approximately 1% per year in per capita 
terms.  Moreover, it is likely that some countries will revert to economic policies that 
emphasize government control and increased protectionism.  As the region’s history 
discussed in Sections II through IV of this paper has shown, these policies rarely work; in 
fact, more often than not they result in lower rates of growth over the longer run.  
On the positive side, there are some – but only some – indications that the region 
will experience a decline in the number of currency crises.  This is because most 
countries have implemented, during the last few years, macroeconomic policies that, 
according to recent research on the subject, reduce the probability of external crises.  
Most specifically, most countries have reduced their fiscal deficits and public debt; also, 
they have pared down their foreign debts; the majority of countries are running current 
account surpluses; and the majority of countries have adopted flexible exchange rates.  
However, whether these healthy macroeconomic policies will be maintained once terms 
of trade and the international environment become less friendly, remains an open 
question.     
                                                 
30 The discussion that follows deals with Latin America’s general economic trends; in reality, however, 
each country has its own reality and its own history.  Going into a detailed country-by-country analysis is 
beyond the scope of this paper, however.   24
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Data Appendix 
 
Variable  Definition Source 
Change in Terms of Trade  Change in term of trade export as 
capacity to imports (constant 
local currency unit) 
World Development Indicators 
Current Account Reversal  Reduction in the current account 
deficit of at least 4% of GDP in 
one year. 
Author’s elaboration based on 
data of current account (World 
Development Indicators) 
Financial openness  1 to 100 index, with higher values 
meaning a higher degree of 
openness 
Author’s construction based on 
indexes of capital restrictions 
computed by Quinn (2003) and 
Mody and Murshid (2002), and 
on country specific data. See 
Edwards (2007c) for details 
GDP per capita growth  Annual % change in real per 
capita GDP. . 
World Development Indicators 
Inflation  Annual % change in consumer 
prices index. 
World Development Indicators 
Major Storm  Dummy = 1 if there was a storm. 
0 otherwise 
EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED 
International Disaster Database 
Sudden Stop  Episodes where (1) the country in 
question received an inflow of 
capital (relative to GDP) larger 
than its region’s third quartile 
during the two years prior to the 
“sudden stop.”, and (2) net capital 
inflows declined by at least 5% of 
GDP in one year. 
Author’s elaboration based on 
data of capital flows (World 
Development Indicators) 
Sudden Stops in Region  Relative occurrence of sudden 
stops in the country’s region 
(excluding the country itself) 
Author’s elaboration. 
Trade Openness   Ratio of imports plus exports 
over GDP 
Author’s elaboration based on 
data of international trade (World 
Development Indicators) 
War  Dummy = 1 if there was a 
conflict in country’s territory. 0 
otherwise 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts 
Dataset 
World Interest Rate  U.S. Real Interest Rate   International Monetary Fund 
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Table 1 
The Dynamics of Growth and Crises, 1970-2004: 
GLS, Random Effects Estimates 
 
  Eq 1.1  Eq 1.2  Eq 1.3  Eq 1.4 
      
Growth  Gap  0.76 0.71 0.75 0.72 
  (23.06) ***  (21.42) ***  (12.57) ***  (11.77) *** 
Change in Terms of Trade  0.09  0.08  0.09  0.08 
  (11.23) ***  (10.86) ***  (6.52) ***  (5.09) *** 
Growth Lag  -0.02  -0.04  0.12  0.11 
 (0.82)  (1.71)  *  (2.59) ***  (2.33) ** 
Reversal  -2.07 -- -3.58 -- 
  (5.64) ***    (5.88) ***   
Sudden  Stop  -- -0.86 -- -2.59 
      (1.7) *     (2.53) ** 
      
R-squared      
within  0.472 0.459 0.443 0.403 
between  0.518 0.020 0.018 0.015 
overall  0.445 0.431 0.430 0.387 
              
Number of observation  2332  2234  557  548 
Number  of  groups  94 93 20 20 
 
Absolute values of robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 
5%; * significant at 10%.   29
Table 2 
The Dynamics of Growth, 1970-2004: 
Two-Steps Maddala Procedure 
 
  Eq 2.1  Eq 2.2  Eq 2.3  Eq 2.4 
      
Growth  Gap  0.72 0.68 0.88 0.63 
  (28.22) ***  (19.12) ***  (9.91) ***  (6.64) *** 
Change in Terms of Trade  0.10  0.09  0.16  0.06 
  (12.94) ***  (10.09) ***  (5.09) ***  (2.58) *** 
Growth Lag  -0.06  -0.10  0.11  -0.05 
 (2.85)  ***  (3.00)  *** (1.67)  *  -0.45 
Reversal  -1.25  -3.72  
  (4.22) ***    (3.06) ***   
Sudden  Stop   -2.08  -2.86 
   (3.1)  ***   (2.73)  *** 
              
R-squared  0.436 0.437 0.419 0.421 
R-squared  adjusted  0.433 0.434 0.407 0.408 
      
Number of observation  2166  2157  530  529 
 
Absolute values of corrected t statistics are reported in parentheses. For list of instruments, see the text. *** 
significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.. Both R-squared and R-squared adjusted from 
the first stage. 
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Table 3 
The Dynamics of Growth, Crises and Openness, 1970-2004: 
GLS, Random Effects Estimates 
 
  Eq 3.1  Eq 3.2  Eq 3.3  Eq 3.4  Eq 3.5  Eq 3.6 
        
Growth  Gap  0.77 0.75 0.77 0.73 0.72 0.73 
  (12.98) ***  (12.53) ***  (12.94) ***  (11.81) ***  (11.75) ***  (11.80) *** 
Change in Terms of Trade  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.08  0.08  0.08 
  (6.70) ***  (6.52) ***  (6.68) ***  (5.07) ***  (5.07) ***  (5.06) *** 
Growth  Lag  0.11 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 
  (2.57) ***  (2.61) ***  (2.57) ***  (2.36) ***  (2.33) ***  (2.35) *** 
Reversal  -5.99 -4.61 -6.05  --  --  -- 
  (6.28) ***  (2.67) ***  (3.66) ***       
Reversal*Trade Openness  0.03  --  0.03  --  --  -- 
  (3.77) ***    (3.17) ***       
Reversal*Financial Openness  --  0.02  0.001  --  --  -- 
    (0.73)   (0.05)        
Sudden  Stop  -- -- --  -4.48  -4.18  -5.07 
        (2.64) ***  (1.64) *  (1.93) * 
Sudden  Stop*Trade  Openness  -- -- --  0.03    0.02 
      (1.88)  *  --  (1.6)   
Sudden  Stop*Financial  Openness  -- -- -- --  0.03  0.01 
       (0.81)    (0.44)   
                    
R-squared        
within  0.456 0.444 0.456 0.406 0.404 0.406 
between  0.009 0.013 0.009 0.015 0.012 0.014 
overall  0.440 0.431 0.440 0.389 0.388  0.39 
                    
Number  of  observation  557 557 557 548 548 548 
Number  of  groups  20 20 20 20 20 20 
 
Absolute values of robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 
5%; * significant at 10%. 
 
 
    